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In	Introduction	to	Logic	and	Theory	of	Knowledge:	Lectures	1906/071,	Edmund	
Husserl	discusses	effectively	two	forms	of	consciousness:	that	of	position	taking	and	that	of	
attention.		The	former	is	added	to	that	of	the	latter,	although	attention	(and	for	that	matter,	
position-taking)	does	generally	presuppose	a	broader	intentionality	for	all	perceptions	and	
objective	apprehension,	thus	constituting	the	general	structure	of	consciousness.2		For	both	
position-taking	and	attention	to	occur,	there	must	first	be	an	object	which	is	given	and	
perceived,	the	consciousness	of	which	is	intentional.		While	this	base	level	of	intentionality	
is	a	precursor	to	attention,	attention	does	serve	as	a	modification	of	intention.		This	means	
that	a	grasping,	whether	it	be	of	the	appearance	of	an	external	object	or	idea	
(transcendental	perception),	or	of	a	grasping	itself	(immanent	perception),	is	undertaken	
in	a	certain	attentive	way	or	mode.		Furthermore,	there	are	a	multitude	of	modifications	of	
attention	that	can	condition	intentional	acts.			What	this	paper	will	explore	is	the	following	
elements	both	directly	and	indirectly	related	to	attention	discussed	by	Husserl:	I)	Its	
definition	and	relation	to	apperception;	II)	The	different	kinds	of	perceptions	which	
attention	modifies,	in	a	noetic	(νόησις)	and	noematic	(νόημα)	context;	III)	Attention’s	
																																																								
1	Husserl,	Edmund	and	Claire	Ortiz	Hill.	Introduction	to	Logic	and	Theory	of	Knowledge:	Lectures	1906/07.								
Dordrecht:	Springer,	2008.	Print.				
2	Husserl,	Edmund	and	Daniel	O.	Dahlstrom.	Ideas	for	a	Pure	Phenomenology	and	Phenomenological	
Philosophy.		Indianapolis:	Hackett,	2014.	Print.		§36.		“All	experiences	are	also	called	‘intentional	experiences’.		
Insofar	as	they	are	consciousness	of	something,	they	are	said	to	be	‘intentionally	related’	to	this	something.”		
Two	exceptions	to	this,	as	we	will	see,	are	bare	attention	and	the	raw	sense	or	hyletic	data.		
	 2	
modes	of	actualization;	IV)	Theme	and	its	relation	with	attention;	V)	How	attention	serves	
as	the	lynchpin	to	taking	a	stance;	and	VI)	Concluding	thoughts.			
I.	Defining	Attention	and	its	Relation	to	Apperception		
In	both	Introduction	to	Logic	and	Ideas	I,	Husserl	ascribes	a	chief	role	to	certain	
phenomena	within	the	sphere	of	attention.		In	the	former,	there	is	mention	of	
“directedness,”	different	degrees	of	“noticing	something,”	“especially	[heeding],”	and	
“beholding.”3		While	Husserl	dubs	the	analogy	“inadequate,”	he	still	sees	some	significance	
to	the	notion	of	comparing	attention	to	a	“light	that	illuminates	things”4	since	there	are	
alterations	in	an	object’s	manner	of	appearance.		There	exists	the	possibility	of	different	
degrees	of	shadowing	and	even,	complete	darkness,	as	Husserl	maintains	inattention	is	
actually	an	attentional	form.5		This	latter	possibility	is	described	as	dead	consciousness	
[Bewußthabens]6.		These	degrees	of	shadowing	can	also	be	thought	of	as	levels	of	
actualization	with	regard	to	attention.		That	what	is	attended	is	actual	(and	degrees	therein	
of	actuality)	or	inactual	in	the	case	of	dead	consciousness.		In	Ideas,	Husserl	also	discusses	
shifts	in	attention	when	there	is	a	“mental	focus”	or	“radiating	focus”	“turning	toward	[or	
away	from	something]”7.		Certainly,	what	is	actual	can	become	inactual,	and	vice-versa.		
Prior	to	there	being	any	kind	of	position-taking,	there	must	be	an	“object	consciousness”8,	
Husserl	tells	us.		There	is	first,	an	underlying	apperception,	which	serves	to	“constitute	an	
																																																								
3	Ibid.,	p.	247,	248,	249	
4	Ibid.,	“	”	
5	Ibid.,	p.	249	
6	Ideas,	§92,	p.	183	
7	Ideas,	§92,	p.	182	
8	Introduction	to	Logic,	p.	247	
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objective	appearance”9.		Husserl	cites	the	case	of	receiving	news	about	the	occurrence	of	an	
event,	for	instance	the	outcome	of	an	election.		There,	the	phenomenon	of	the	statement	
apperceptively	constitutes	reference	to	a	fact.		
We	“live”	in	this	perceptual	apperception	“attentively”10,	Husserl	explains.		This	
apperception	can	also	be	thought	of	as	a	presentation,	which	makes	its	objectivity	
“presentational,”	bringing	it	to	consciousness.11		The	sum	total	of	these	apperceptive	
experiences	constitutes	the	objective	background.		Husserl	surmises	that	it	is	“probable”12	
that	some	determination	of	attention	belongs	to	every	apperception.		Furthermore,	a	“full,	
concrete	apperception”	includes	some	attentional	form.		Thus,	attentional	consciousness	
and	apperception	together	serve	as	the	foundation	of	higher	forms	of	consciousness,	such	
as	acts	of	judgment	and	positings.		As	mentioned,	Husserl	also	describes	attention	as	a	
modification	of	intention,	and	as	a	“moment	that	[varies]	independently	[of	it]”.13		Later	on	
in	the	paper,	we	will	discuss	possible	configurations	of	these	two	moments.	
II.	Immanent	and	Transcendent	Essences	and	Perceptions		
Attention	is	evident	alongside	perception,	which	itself	merits	a	more	detailed	
analysis.		Husserl	of	course	draws	an	essential	distinction	between	the	object	itself	and	the	
“sense	of	[the]	perception,”14	for	example	that	of	a	tree,	and	moreover	indicates	this	sense	
is	inherent	to	the	essence	of	the	tree.		Husserl	delineates	two	different	kinds	of	essences,	
which	in	turn	correspond	to	perceptions:	immanent	and	transcendent.		The	former	refer	to	
																																																								
9	Ibid.,	“	”	
10	Ibid.,	p.	246	
11	Ibid.,	p.	247	
12	Ibid.,	p.	248	
13	Ibid.,	p.	247	
14	Ideas,	§89,	p.	177	
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“configurations	of	consciousness	itself”	and	the	latter	to	essences	or	perceptions	of	
individual	occurrences	that	transcend	consciousness,	those	that	are	““constituted”	in	
consciousness	through	sensory	appearances”.15		
Where	we	discuss	perception	there	is	part	and	parcel	to	it	both	noetic	and	noematic	
aspects,	which	together	constitute	the	structure	of	intentionality	as	a	whole.		The	noetic	
aspect	of	an	experience	includes	focusing	on	what	the	“sense	of	the	object	entails”	16	and	
includes	various	forms	of	apprehending	it.		The	noema,	which	is	inextricably	linked	to	a	
given	noesis,	means	the	“sense”	of	the	experience,	as	the	object	presents	itself	to	us17.	
Given	that	the	act	of	perception	is	a	kind	of	noesis,	we	can	refer	back	to	the	
transcendent	and	immanent	categories.		With	transcendent	perception18	we	have	a	
grasping	(noesis)	of	a	transcendent	object	that	is	not	a	part	of	the	stream	of	consciousness,	
which	can	include	references	to	either	physical	objects	or	ideas,	such	as	love	or	freedom.		In	
other	words,	the	transcendent	perception	(its	sense,	the	noema)	is	one	that	is	presented	
immanently	inside	consciousness	but	refers	to	a	transcendent	object,	yielding	what	Husserl	
calls	transcendence	within	the	immanence.		In	the	case	of	immanent	perceptions19,	they	are	
of	an	immanent	object,	or	an	object	that	is	a	part	of	the	stream	of	consciousness,	such	as	the	
perception	of	a	physical	object	or	the	thinking	of	an	idea.		Any	“grasping	of	a	grasping”	
(noesis	as	noema)	qualifies	as	an	immanent	perception.			
																																																								
15	Ideas,	§61,	p.	112		
16	Ideas,	§88,	p.	174	
17	Ibid.,	“	”	
18	In	Ideas,	Husserl	refers	to	this	kind	as	“outer	perceptions”	(§113,	p.	220).		He	also	discusses	them	as	“acts	
directed	at	essences	or	at	intentional	experiences	of	other	egos	with	other	streams	of	experiences”	(§38,	p.	
66)	
19	Ibid.,	called	“exceptional	reflections”	(§113,	p.	220).		Earlier	on	in	the	text,	he	describes	them	as	
experiences	“in	which	it	is	essential	that	their	intentional	objects,	if	they	exist	at	all,	belong	to	the	same	
stream	of	experience	as	they	do”	(§38,	p.	66).		
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As	we	have	seen,	Husserl	describes	attention	as	a	modification	of	intention.		It	
“[mixes]	together”	with	the	entire	field	of	potential	noeses	but	it	itself	is	neither	a	noesis,	
nor	noema	for	that	matter20.		Higher	levels	of	intention	do	presuppose	some	form	of	
attention	as	has	been	discussed,	but	attention	modifies	these	intentions	insofar	as	there	are	
different	forms	of	it	that	can	be	attached	to	them.		These	possible	shifts	in	attention	in	turn	
display	variations	in	the	entire	experience,	from	both	the	noetic	and	noematic	sides.21	
III.	Attention’s	Modes	of	Actualization	(and	Inactualization)	
	 Now	that	we	have	defined	attention	both	intrinsically	and	relatively	speaking	
(insofar	as	how	it	relates	to	lower	and	higher	forms	of	consciousness),	we	must	delineate	
attention’s	different	modes	of	actualization	in	this	world	as	well	as	in	those	of	memory	and	
phantasy.		First,	we	will	describe	attention’s	modifications	as	outlined	by	Husserl.		As	the	
subject’s	focus	passes	through	different	noetic	layers	and	noema,	there	is	a	range	of	
gradations	of	“noticing”	or	“looking	toward.”		Here,	I	am	referring	to	“primary	looking	
toward,”	“preferentially-noticing-something-apperceived”22,	and	on	the	other	hand	
different	modes	of	secondary	attentiveness,	such	as	“including-too-besides”,	and	“just	
noticed	along	with	[something	else]”23.		One	can	also	notice	parts	of	an	object,	either	in	a	
polymorphic	context	or	process,	or	not.24		There	are	in	addition	the	modes	of	“looking-
especially-at”,	“immersing-oneself	into-what-was-beheld”25.		These	modes	can	either	be	
																																																								
20	Ibid.,	§92,	p.	182	
21	“	”	
22	Introduction	to	Logic,	p.	247	
23	Ideas,	§92,	p.	183	
24	“	”,	p.	182	
25	Introduction	to	Logic,	p.	249.			This	will	also	count	as	being	in	the	category	of	immanent	perception	as	we	
will	see.	
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employed	as	the	subject	“[attends]	to	along	the	way”26	or	in	a	more	fixed	fashion,	what	
Husserl	calls	the	“fastening”	on	a	thing	consciously	perceived27.			
	 Husserl	explains	that	attentiveness	passes	through	objects	of	perception	
“sometimes	directly,	sometimes	by	reflecting.”28		This	refers	to	attending	to	either	
transcendent	perceptions	(directly)	involving	an	external	object	or	idea,	or	alternatively,	an	
immanent	perception	of	a	perception	(grasping),	which	would	refer	to	the	reflective	
possibility.		All	of	these	different	modifications	of	attention	can	take	hold	in	this	world	as	
well	as	in	memory	and	phantasy.		In	this	world,	it	is	easiest	to	see	how	attention	fastens	
onto	transcendent	perceptions	since	we	are	continuously	being	struck	by	an	“appearing	
world	of	things.”29		The	experience	of	fastening	onto	these	perceptions	can	vary	according	
to	the	aforementioned	levels	of	attentiveness.		These	differences	affect	the	noetic	
composition	as	well	as	the	noemata	of	an	experience.			
	 Within	memories	and	phantasies,	we	can	readily	see	the	centrality	of	immanent	
perceptions.		We	can	also	move	into	“as	if”	mode	such	that	we	perceive	primarily	(and	
attend	to	primarily)	a	marginal	attentiveness	from	our	memory	or	just	as	easily	within	a	
phantasy	world.		Husserl	presents	a	hypothetical	experience	of	having	walked	through	the	
Dresden	Gallery	to	illustrate	the	noetic	reflective	possibilities	of	both	phantasy	and	
memory,	where	“we	can	live	in	the	contemplation	of	the	pictures	and	find	ourselves	in	the	
worlds	of	the	pictures.”30		In	this	example,	clearly	Husserl	is	not	referring	to	a	pure	
beholding	but	rather	to	a	set	of	emotive	and	intellectual	acts,	meaning	any	feelings	of	joy	or	
																																																								
26	Ideas,	§35,	p.	61	
27	Ideas,	§92,	p.	183	
28	“	”,	p.	182		
29	“	”,	p.	182	
30	Ideas,	§101,	p.	204	
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sadness,	or	judgments	directed	towards	the	pictures	of	the	Gallery.		Nonetheless,	as	we	
have	seen,	these	intentionalities	belonging	to	higher	levels	of	consciousness	presuppose	an	
attentive	consciousness.			
The	connection	with	attention	is	two-fold:	1)	One	can	grasp	a	grasping	that	must	
include	alongside	it	a	given	(e.g.,	marginal)	level	of	attentiveness;	or	2)	One	can	say,	
marginally	attend	to	a	grasping	of	a	grasping	(e.g.,	an	act).		In	the	former	case,	for	instance,	
within	a	phantasy	world	one	constructs,	the	subject	in	question	is	playing	in	the	Final	
match	of	the	Wimbledon	Tennis	Tournament	and	the	fans	are	cheering	him	on	to	win	a	
decisive	point.		He	can	grasp,	while	perceiving	that	scene	in	his	phantasy	world,	his	
marginal	attentiveness	to	the	cool	breeze	passing	through	the	stadium.		In	the	latter	
scenario,	the	subject	could	be	driving	home	from	the	cinema	and	while	primarily	focusing	
on	the	police	car	in	his	rearview	mirror,	become	marginally	attentive	towards	the	feeling	of	
joy	he	experienced	when	the	protagonist	of	the	film	he	watched	eluded	his	would-be	
captors.	
IV.	Theme	and	its	Relation	with	Attention	
We	have	already	seen	how	attention	is	attached	to	different	kinds	of	perception.		
There	is	then	a	“fastening”	that	takes	place	–	but	upon	what	content?		In	The	Sphere	of	
Attention:	Context	and	Margin,	P.	Sven	Arvidson	deals	with	this	question	through	the	
theories	on	attention	put	forth	by	a	number	of	psychologists,	thinkers,	and	
phenomenologists,	including	Husserl.		The	theme	is	the	focus	of	attention	and	it	is	
“segregated	from	the	background”,	Arvidson	explains	using	an	example	of	a	dog	playing	in	
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a	yard31.		In	that	case,	the	dog	would	be	the	theme	since	it	represents	an	object	that	
endures	for	the	subject.		
Under	what	conditions	does	an	object	become	a	theme?		In	considering	Husserl’s	
work	entitled	Analyses	Concerning	Active	and	Passive	Synthesis,	Arvidson	cites	Husserl’s	
stance	that	a	particularly	noticeable	part	or	element	can	bring	to	one’s	attention	a	larger	
whole32.		For	example,	an	“especially	mellifluous	sound”	could	bring	to	my	attention	the	
entire	melody,	Husserl	explains	in	that	text.		In	Ideas,	he	outlines	how	a	theme	is	
implemented	and	established.		There	is	a	“point	of	engagement”	which	originates	a	thesis	
(what	is	in	effect,	a	theme)	followed	by	a	“taking	hold	of	it,”	which	then	changes	to	“having	
it	in	one’s	grip.”33			
While	Husserl	suggests	that	in	many	cases,	there	is	only	one	theme	had	in	one’s	grip	
at	a	time,	there	is	also	the	possibility	for	simultaneous	themes	potentially	“infiltrating	and	
disturbing	one	another.”34		Equally	if	not	more	likely,	however,	is	a	persisting	theme	amidst	
a	shift	or	shifts	in	attention.		For	example,	if	the	dog	playing	in	the	yard	is	the	theme,	and	
the	subject’s	cell	phone	rings	prompting	him	to	answer	it,	his	primary	attention	would	be	
temporarily	diverted	to	the	phone	conversation,	thus	leading	him	to	only	secondarily	
attend	to	the	dog	in	the	yard,	if	at	all.		Nonetheless,	the	dog	playing	in	the	yard	would	
continue	to	serve	as	the	theme.		Husserl	explains	a	similar	possibility	within	the	context	of	
what	he	calls	an	“implemented”	act,	which	could	constitute	a	theme:	
	
																																																								
31	Arvidson,	P.	Sven.	The	Sphere	of	Attention:	Context	and	Margin.	Vol.	54.	Dordrecht:	Springer,	2006.	87.	Print.	
Contributions	to	Phenomenology.	
32	Ibid.,	p.	110	
33	Ideas,	§122,	p.	242	
34	Ibid.,	§122,	p.	244	
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The	experience	of	an	implemented	perception,	an	implemented	judgment,	feeling,	
willing	does	not	vanish	if	the	attention	turns	“exclusively”	to	something	new,	
entailing	that	the	ego	“lives”	in	a	new	cogito	exclusively.		The	earlier	cogito	“fades	
away,”	sinks	into	the	“darkness,”	but	still	it	always	has	an	existence	as	an	
experience,	even	if	a	modified	existence.35	
Here,	we	have	a	case	where	a	prior	held	judgment	and	experience	is	retained,	even	if	in	an	
inattentive	form	(still	a	form	of	attention).		It	should	also	be	noted	that	in	the	case	of	the	
dog	above,	if	the	subject	returns	to	the	theme	of	his	pet	playing	in	the	yard	after	finishing	
the	phone	conversation,	he	is	still	conscious	of	the	call	secondarily.		Husserl	walks	us	
through	an	analogous	example	of	being	distracted	by	a	sound,	prompting	him	to	attend	to	
it:			
I	focus	for	a	moment	on	the	[whistle],	but	then	quickly	return	to	the	old	theme.		My	
apprehension	of	the	sound	is	not	erased,	I	am	still	conscious	of	the	whistle	in	a	
modified	way,	but	it	is	no	longer	in	my	mental	grip.		It	does	not	belong	to	the	theme	
–	not	even	to	a	parallel	theme.36		
In	this	case,	we	have	the	sound,	which	is	a	kind	of	affection-based	attention	that	is	
involuntary;	and	on	the	other	hand,	we	have	the	thematic	interest,	which	is	attended	to	
alongside	a	certain	intentional	nature.		The	key	point	is	that	attention	and	theme,	which	
serves	as	a	kind	of	proxy	for	intention,	vary	independently	of	each	other.		While	on	many	
occasions	they	do	converge,	they	can	and	do	diverge	at	other	times.	
V.	Attention	as	Lynchpin	in	Process	Moving	To	Judgment		
	 Husserl	indicates	that	pure	attentional	beholding	is	possible37	without	any	
intention,	but	that	the	reverse	does	not	hold.		“Acts	are	totally,	without	a	doubt,	
																																																								
35	Ibid.,	§115,	p.	226	
36	Ibid.,	§122,	p.	243	
37	Introduction	to	Logic,	p.	249.		“Pure	beholding	is	possible	and	can	also	be	shown	without	any	position-
taking,	a	merely	attentional	beholding,	without	any	intention.”		Here,	Husserl	seems	to	be	referring	to	the	
pure	act	of	attending	or	bare	attention	where	there	is	no	content	towards	which	the	attention	is	directed.		It	is	
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inconceivable	without	attentional	consciousness	and	apperception	as	foundation,”	the	
German	philosopher	and	phenomenologist	declared	in	a	lecture	included	in	Introduction	to	
Logic	and	Theory	of	Knowledge38.		In	order	to	take	a	position,	for	example,	such	that	“the	
dog	playing	in	the	yard	is	enjoying	himself,”	one	has	to	first	attend	to	the	dog	playing	in	the	
yard.		We	can	see	how	attention	is	both	separate	from	taking	a	position,	but	also	how	it	is	
essential	for	the	latter	since	as	in	this	example,	the	subject	must	attend	to	“the	enjoying”	
before	placing	it	in	the	context	of	the	entire	scene.		In	Husserl’s	words,	implementing	acts	
such	as	this	“presupposes	focusing	attention	positively	on	that	toward	which	the	ego	takes	
a	position.”39		The	different	modes	of	attentiveness,	which	have	already	been	discussed,	
“condition”40	the	noeses	in	question.		The	noematic	content	changes	in	terms	of	its	manner	
of	appearance,	however	it	is	the	noetic	side,	which	is	in	fact	conditioned	by	these	different	
attentional	modes,	according	to	Husserl.				
The	subject	freely	chooses41	all	positing	acts	or	acts	of	judgment.		With	attention,	a	
lower	form	of	consciousness,	there	is	not	this	same	degree	of	freedom.		And	yet,	according	
to	Husserl,	there	are	still	traces	of	the	self	when	one	attends.		“In	their	modes	of	
actualization,	the	configurations	of	attention	have	the	character	of	subjectivity	in	a	pre-
eminent	manner,”42	he	explains.		When	“the	ego”	takes	a	stance,	as	we	have	seen,	it	“lives”	
																																																								
therefore	a	“form	of	consciousness”,	but	not	a	“consciousness	of	something.”		Nonetheless,	it	seems	that	
something	has	to	be	perceptually	given,	if	not	in	the	full	objective	sense,	even	in	this	bare	attentive	mode.	
38	Ibid.,	“	”In	a	footnote,	Husserl	indicates	if	not	an	actual	position	taking,	an	“imagination”	must	be	given	
alongside	the	attentional	form.	
39	Ideas,	§92,	p.	184	
40	“		”		
41	In	Ideas,	Husserl	cites	the	ego’s	positing	something	as	being	the	work	of	“its	free	spontaneity	[freie	
Spontaneität]	and	activity”	(§122,	p.	242).		“Spontaneität”	given	its	Latin	etymology	(sua	sponte),	and	its	
“freie”	modifier,	indicates	a	course	of	action	that	is	unplanned	and	also	of	one’s	own	free	will.	
42	“	”	
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in	such	acts	attentively.		It	is	in	the	way	in	which	it	lives	where	we	can	glean	what	Husserl	
meant	by	the	term	subjectivity.		This	living	means	a	“manifold	of	describable	manners”	
with	respect	to	how	the	“free	entity”	might	live	in	intentional	experiences.43		Thus,	the	
modes	of	attention	that	we	have	discussed	constitute	a	range	of	potentialities	for	the	
subject	to	modify	its	intentional	acts.44		As	attention	can	be	of	an	involuntary	nature	but	
also	serves	as	a	prerequisite	for	and	modifier	of	higher	forms	of	consciousness,	it	truly	is	
the	interface	of	passivity	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	spontaneously	and	freely	choosing	
subject,	on	the	other.				
VI.	Concluding	Thoughts		
	 How	Husserl	defines	attention	and	its	modes	eidetically,	and	its	relation	to	other	
necessary	and	auxiliary	forms	of	consciousness,	such	as	apperception	and	acts	of	judgment,	
have	constituted	the	themes	of	this	paper.		It	behooves	us,	however,	to	place	this	discussion	
of	attention	within	the	context	of	the	larger	project	at	work	in	Ideas	and	elsewhere	in	the	
German	thinker’s	oeuvre.		In	the	Editorial	Introduction	to	The	Collected	Works	of	Aron	
Gurwitsch,	an	anthology	of	texts	produced	by	a	phenomenologist	who	was	once	a	student	of	
Husserl’s,	Richard	Zaner	pinpoints	the	thrust	of	the	latter’s	theorizing	as	setting	out	to	
“determine	what	we	do	experience,	and	thence	to	account	for	the	relation	of	that	to	what	
‘truly	exists.’”45		Husserl	reconciles	the	difference	between	the	object	of	object	
consciousness	and	the	objective	thing	by	way	of	attention	and	intentional	acts	that	are	
																																																								
43	“	”	
44	Furthermore,	we	can	think	about	how	voluntary	or	not	the	control	of	attention	is.	Attention	itself	is	not	
intention	but	we	can	think	about	how	the	degree	to	which	one	attends	could	in	certain	cases	be	controlled.	
Indeed	with	that	intentional	act,	as	with	any	other,	there	would	have	to	be	some	founding	form	of	
attentiveness.	
45	Gurwitsch,	Aron.	The	Collected	Works	of	Aron	Gurwitsch	(1901-1973):	Theme,	Thematic	Field,	and	Margin.	
Ed.	Richard	M.	Zaner.	Vol.	III.	Dordrecht:	Springer,	2010.	Print.	p.	xviii	
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essential	to	the	process	by	which	“objects	are	made	to	present	themselves	to	
consciousness.”46		In	a	text	inside	the	anthology,	Gurwitsch	explains	we	can	come	to	
appreciate	this	since	nothing	in	the	raw	sense	data	(ὕλη),	according	to	Husserl,	
“unambiguously	determines	their	objective	reference.”47		The	same	complex	of	hyletic	data	
“may	receive	various	apperceptions	and	interpretations	so	that	different	objects	may	
present	themselves	through	acts	of	perception	all	containing	the	same	sense-data.”48		These	
sense	impressions	are	animated	and	acted	upon	by	perceptions	and	noeses,	or	what	
Husserl	calls	the	intentional	μορφή,	to	grasp	and	realize	meaning.	
	 The	noeses	give	a	form	to	the	hyletic	data,	from	which	a	“noematic	sense”	emerges,	
and	with	the	tying	together	of	the	noeses	with	the	noemas,	both	give	meaning,	whether	
there	is	indeed	an	external	world	or	not.49		As	we	have	seen,	however,	it	is	the	multitude	of	
attentive	modes	that	found	and	condition	these	intentional	acts,	and	thus	it	is	that	lower	
form	of	consciousness	that	helps	to	make	meaning	possible	in	the	first	place.	
________________________________	
																																																								
46	Gurwitsch,	Aron.	Studies	in	Phenomenology	and	Psychology.	Northwestern	UP,	1966.	Print.	p.	219	
47	The	Collected	Works,	p.	261	
48	Ibid.,	“	”	
49	Husserl	suspends	judgment	on	the	external	world’s	existence.		He	exercises	the	phenomenological	ἐποχή	
that	“utterly	closes	off	for	me	every	judgment	about	spatiotemporal	existence”	(§32,	p.	56)	
